



Evaluation and Objections to Judith Thomson in “People and their Bodies”
In her essay, “People and their Bodies,” Judith Thomson writes an evaluation of 
several formulations of the psychological criterion for personality, explaining her 
criticisms of each. The fundamental problem Thomson identifies that she believes 
makes the psychological criterion weaker than a physical criterion is that she does not 
believe the psychological criterion offers a clear ontological thesis of personhood, and 
that this omission leads to several problems in clarifying the psychological view of 
personal identity as well as puzzlingly counterintuitive implications.  In this essay, I 1
will explain Thomson’s central criticisms against what she refers to as Pure, Impure, 
and Hybrid conceptions of psychological criteria for personal identity and proceed to 
consider possible objections to her position that a proponent of a psychological view 
might respond with.  These objections will primarily be focused on how Thomson 2
chooses to characterize psychological criteria and her hastiness in drawing conclusions 
with dramatic implications for the view. 
Thomson begins her analysis of the psychological approach to personal identity 
by means of several similar thought experiments in which a man, Brown, has his 
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psychology or brain somehow implanted in the body of a different man, Robinson, 
under different conditions. By entertaining the thought of Brown’s brain being 
transplanted into Robinson’s body, Thomson is able to consider two alternatives - one 
where the brain retains the psychological properties of Brown and thus, the Robinson-
body displays the psychological characteristics of Brown; and one where the brain from 
Brown’s body is altered by drugs such that it resembles the Robinson’s body original 
brain. In these two cases, Thomson points out that we would be inclined to agree that 
the first of the two apparently appears to preserve Brown’s identity while the only 
reason we would seem to have for the second case preserving Brown would be that the 
brain originally came from Brown’s body, the fact of which alone, Thomson points out, 
does not appear determinative of identity if the psychology has the features of the 
original Robinson.
On the basis of the distinction drawn between the two cases in which the 
presence of psychological continuity seems to be factor determining whether or not we 
say Brown has survived the procedure, Thomson clarifies two possible positions for the 
advocate of a psychological criterion - the pure psychological criterion in which 
reprogramming Robinson’s brain with the psychology present in Brown’s brain would 
be sufficient for a transfer of identity, and the impure psychological criterion, in which only 
the transfer of the fully physical brain of Brown as a carrier of his psychology would be 
sufficient for transferring his identity into Robinson’s body. Thomson explicitly chooses 
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to not consider as seriously the impure psychological criterion in her analysis of 
psychological justification for personal identity on the basis that she cannot see why it 
would be necessary for the same physical brain to generate the transported psychology.  3
She uses the example of a transplanted, brain-reprogramming liver from Brown as a 
means of demonstrating the superfluousness of any particular transplanted part to the 
psychological view.4
In considering the Pure Psychological criterion in more depth, Thomson 
proceeds to criticize that the view ultimately does not seem adequate to answering the 
question of what a person’s ontological status might be thought to be without some 
kind of revision or clarification. She considers a possible answer from the Psychological 
criterion proponent in the form of a Hybrid View of Personal Identity in which personal 
identity is thought to be determined by psychological continuity, but that persons 
nonetheless are their bodies ontologically. Thomson proceeds to consider several 
problematic implications of this conclusion, namely the seeming inconsistency from 
asserting that identity results from the possibility of psychologically continuous 
duplicates in distinct physical bodies or what she claims to be the necessity of inter-
 Thomson, Judith Jarvis. "Judith Jarvis Thomson, People and their bodies - PhilPapers." Judith 3
Jarvis Thomson, People and their bodies - PhilPapers. January 01, 1970. Accessed March 07, 
2017. https://philpapers.org/rec/THOPAT-3. p.206,207
 Thomson, Judith Jarvis. "Judith Jarvis Thomson, People and their bodies - PhilPapers." Judith 4
Jarvis Thomson, People and their bodies - PhilPapers. January 01, 1970. Accessed March 07, 
2017. https://philpapers.org/rec/THOPAT-3. p.207
!4
temporal metaphysical objects as an implausible conclusion for delineating persons 
within this framework.  5
It is primarily in Thomson’s limitation of what she believes to be a reasonable 
view of a psychological criterion for personal identity that I believe a proponent of the 
psychological criterion may find to be the most mistaken aspect of her critique. Firstly, 
Thomson does not seem to at all recognize in her Brown thought experiment the 
possibility that reprogramming the brain with the psychology once housed in a 
different brain may lead to a qualitatively identical set of psychological characteristics, 
but not a numerically identical set. Presuming that an essentially identical psychological 
state can arise from wholly new matter appears to be a significant assumption that 
Thomson does not explain. If numerical identity is not necessary, it is not clear why this 
would be the case or at least why we should presume it. One could seemingly be 
skeptical that the same numerical flow of consciousness could be transplanted by 
information reprogramming alone. It’s not clear at all how identity or my experience as 
a person would be conserved when it seems as though it may be another conscious 
experiencer who incidentally has my character, memories, and preferences due to an 
information upload. The Impure Psychological Criterion appears sufficient in a way 
that the Pure is not because it seems to ensure (assuming that all adequate brain and 
neurological structures are successfully transplanted) that not only my outwardly 
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evident and demonstrable psychological characteristics are conserved, but that I am 
numerically the same conscious experiencer as the person prior to the transplant. 
Furthermore, Thomson does not appear to provide any descriptive justification for 
arguing against the Pure as opposed to the Impure conception other than the notion of 
the brain-reprogramming liver, which seems difficult to conceive at all as a 
counterfactual possibility, at least without some further causal elaboration of what she 
actually figures to occur. 
An example further demonstrating the problem of the Pure conception as a 
catch-all characterization of the psychological criterion of the would be to suppose that I 
were to fall asleep and all of the relevant information from my brain was stored on a 
computer and used to reconfigure the brain of another sleeping person such that he 
becomes psychologically identical to me in memory, character, and preferences. 
Following this process, my body is then completely destroyed. Is there any reason to 
think that I should wake up and have the experience of being the once distinct sleeping 
person after this procedure is performed? Unless the phenomenon of my entire 
experience of my outside and inner worlds is emergent purely from the information 
stored in my or any brain, it doesn’t seem that my experience of the world that I 
consider fundamental to me would be conserved. Even if the assumption is granted that 
my entire experience may be thought to emerge from information alone, how then 
would it be explained that I would not have conscious experience as the computer that 
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my brain’s data was housed in? If I were to then concede the possibility of having a 
conscious and full personal experience as an advanced enough computer, then if the 
data in my brain is left in the computer as the new brain and body with my information 
awakens, which one would I then be supposed to have the experience of being? Having 
the experience of being both a computer and a new body with a new brain 
simultaneously seems nearly impossible to conceive, let alone consider a possibility. 
This thought experiment could seemingly be extended to include an infinite number of 
computers, bodies, and brains with my identical information to the point where 
imagining an experience as all of these entities simultaneously seems much too difficult 
to accept in any manner that would lead me to conclude preservation of identity. 
Although Thomson may have a concurrent opinion that the results of the thought 
experiment weigh against consideration of the Pure formulation of the psychological 
criterion, it’s curious that she does not view this problem as reason to consider the 
Impure Psychological criterion more seriously as opposed to the Pure Psychological 
criterion that she insists on addressing with more detail. 
Insofar as an a proponent of the Hybrid Personal Identity criterion may respond 
to Thomson’s claims of implausible necessary implications, it appears as though there 
may be other alternatives that could be invoked outside of the view that persons be 
determined by inter-temporal metaphysics as Thomson claims.  One possible approach 6
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for the Hybridist, instead of trying to separate bodily persons across time and 
consistently connect them with psychological continuity, could be to interpret a 
particular mind and psychology as emergent of the numerical identical physical brain 
that a person possesses. This approach would seem to preclude the possibility of body-
switching and thus serve the Hybridist by avoiding the implications of duplicates with 
which the Pure Psychology criterion proponent must contend. It is a concern that saying 
a person is entirely identical to her body could not be entirely consistent with an 
emergentist position, but this potential alteration of the Hybridist position nonetheless 
seems to avoid the problems of sharing identity with  multiple, psychologically 
continuous bodies and can characterize the relation between psychological 
characteristics of a person and brain that do not necessarily need to call upon inter-
temporal metaphysics. Rather, the psychological continuity of personal identity could 
instead be redefined to only include the the numerical psychological characteristics 
emergent from one bodily brain as opposed to many other candidate brains from which 
distinct numerical psychologies could be said to emerge, even with identical 
information uploaded into them. 
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